Serge Vaudenay



http://lasec.epfl.ch/

EASEC

encryption based on card shuffling

# **Every Day I'm Shuffling**



Tung Hoang, Morris, Rogaway; Crypto 2012

proc 
$$E_{KF}(X)$$
  
key:  $K_1, \ldots, K_r, F_1, \ldots, F_r$   
1: **for**  $i = 1$  to  $r$  **do**  
2:  $X' \leftarrow K_i \oplus X$   
3:  $\hat{X} \leftarrow \max(X, X')$   
4: if  $F_i(\hat{X}) = 1$  then  $X \leftarrow X'$   
5: **end for**

6: return X

#### secure when KF is uniformly distributed

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    - in round *i*, let *j* be the highest index such that  $(K_i)_j = 1$
    - $\hat{X} = \max(X, X \oplus K_i) = X \oplus \overline{\operatorname{bit}_j(X)} K_i$
    - $X_{\text{new}} = X \oplus (L_i \cdot \hat{X}) K_i$
    - these functions have algebraic degree 1 in X
    - encryption is linear!

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• open questions:

could it be secure with a distribution over a smaller set? could we replace max by another symmetric function?

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an idea by Henri Gilbert:

 $F_i(x) =$ majority  $(L_i \cdot x, L'_i \cdot x, L'_i \cdot x)$ 

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